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Although the prices in ﬁnancial markets play an important role in improving al-
locative eﬃciency in the real economy, few models of securities markets explicitly in-
corporate resource allocation decisions. In this paper, we study the equilibrium in a
securities market when the market price provides valuable information that can im-
p r o v ea l l o c a t i v ee ﬃciency. We show that a decision maker will subsidize liquidity in an
illiquid securities market to gather valuable information about her decision payoﬀs. We
also show that a decision maker’s liquidity subsidy improves expected social welfare by
enhancing allocative eﬃciency, but does not induce the socially optimal level of infor-
mation acquisition. Finally, we demonstrate that the mere acto fl i n k i n gt h ea l l o c a t i o n
decision to the market price will typically enhance liquidity in the securities market.
Overall, our results highlight the potential of using securities markets for information
to improve decisions.
1 Introduction
There is a growing body of theoretical and empirical research on securities markets for
contingent claims on uncertain events, sometimes called information or prediction markets.
∗Assistant Professor, Department of Finance, University of Texas at Austin; e-mail: tet-
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†Executive Director, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Washington, DC. The authors
would like to thank Aydogan Alti, Andres Almazan, John Griﬃn, Douglas Diamond, Lorenzo Garlappi,
Robin Hanson, John Ledyard, Don Lien, Paul Milgrom, Marco Ottaviani, Sheridan Titman, Justin Wolfers,
Eric Zitzewitz, and participants at the London Business School information markets conference and in the
UT Austin ﬁnance seminar series for helpful comments. The usual disclaimer applies.
1The main ﬁnding of this literature is that the prices in information markets can be used to
provide forecasts that have a lower mean squared prediction error than conventional alter-
natives. For example, the prices in information markets produce more accurate forecasts of
presidential election outcomes than election polls (Berg, Forsythe, Nelson and Rietz (2003)),
better forecasts of printer sales than oﬃcial corporate forecasts (Chen and Plott (2002)), and
improved weather forecasts relative to statistical algorithms used by the National Weather
Service (Roll (1988)).1
Several researchers have noted the potential of information markets to improve decisions
(e.g., Hanson (2002), Abramowicz (2004), and Sunstein (2006)). In principle, the range of
applications is virtually limitless–from helping business make better investments decisions
to helping government make better decisions on ﬁscal or monetary policy.2 While few would
dispute the potential of these markets, several scholars have noted that there are fundamen-
tal theoretical challenges (see, e.g., Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2006) and Ledyard (2006)). A
key issue is whether linking an information market to a decision–what we call a decision
market–changes the strategies of various agents. For example, a trader who has an interest
in a decision based on an information market may behave diﬀe r e n t l yi nt h a tm a r k e ti fs h e
knew that her behavior in the market could possibly aﬀect the decision. We need a theory
to inform how to design such markets that explicitly includes the role of the decision maker.
Furthermore, we need a theory that helps to measure the extent to which decision markets
can be expected to improve individual decisions and social welfare.
To date, we are not aware of any paper that addresses these problems directly and only
one that does so indirectly (Holmstrom and Tirole (1993)). This paper attempts to ﬁll
that void, focusing on the economic value that is created when decisions are made based
on better information (e.g., Blackwell (1951, 1953), Raiﬀa and Schlaifer (1961) and Raiﬀa
(1968)). Speciﬁcally, we are interested in how to use information markets to make better
resource allocation decisions. Our modeling results would also apply to situations in which
a government wants to use information markets to make welfare-enhancing policy decisions.
The information market modeled here is a special case of a securities market in which
no capital is raised and the security pays oﬀ an amount based on a veriﬁable measure of
the decision maker’s production revenues. Our motivation is that a decision maker may not
1See Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004) for a more comprehensive survey of research on information markets.
2Decision makers already informally condition their policies on market prices as a matter of routine. For
example, ﬁrms condition their decisions of whether to launch a new product on prevailing prices in related
markets. Firms often decide whether to issue equity based on recent equity returns. The Federal Reserve
decides whether to cut interest rates based on inﬂation rates.
2require ﬁnancing for a production task, but could still beneﬁt from decision-relevant infor-
mation revealed by a securities market price.3 Because production revenues depend on the
general economic environment, knowledgeable experts who cannot productively undertake
the endeavor often have useful information about its payoﬀs.4 Sometimes it is too costly
for the decision maker to ﬁnd, identify, and write individually tailored contracts with these
experts. Furthermore, some experts will be more willing to reveal information if they can
remain anonymous.5 These considerations suggest that a decision maker with limited infor-
mation about her production revenues should consider using a securities market as a means
for aggregating experts’ information.
In this paper, we study the equilibrium in a securities market when the security price
provides valuable information that can improve allocative eﬃciency. In general, we show
that a decision maker will provide a liquidity subsidy in a securities market to enhance
the informational eﬃciency of the security price and her production proﬁts. The liquidity
subsidy, which equals her trading losses, is more than oﬀset by the increase in her production
proﬁts.
We make three contributions to the theory of securities markets. First, to our knowledge,
our approach is the ﬁrst to demonstrate how a rational decision maker will participate in a
securities market for decision-relevant information. It is also the ﬁrst to formally justify a
direct liquidity subsidy as a means for improving decision making. Our models show that
a decision maker will provide a liquidity subsidy in situations where a competitive market
maker would provide very little or no liquidity. Our second contribution is to show that
the decision maker’s liquidity subsidy always improves expected social welfare by enhancing
allocative eﬃciency, but does not induce the socially optimal level of information acquisition.
Finally, we show how the mere act of linking a resource allocation decision to the securities
market price will typically enhance liquidity even when the decision maker does not intervene
in the securities market. Well-known theorems in ﬁnance that imply trade between rational
agents will not occur (e.g., Milgrom and Stokey (1982)) do not apply to our models because
3Although the prices in securities markets play an important role in improving decisions in the real
economy, only a few models of securities markets directly address investment and production decisions (e.g.,
Diamond (1980), Holmstrom and Tirole (1993), Dow and Gorton (1997) and Subramanyam and Titman
(1999)). In contrast to our study, all of these models focus on capital markets in which the entrepreneur
raises funding for a productive asset.
4Similarly, people inside a ﬁrm who do not control an allocation decision may be able to provide useful
information.
5Osband (1989) develops an insightful model of how a principal would write individual contracts with
non-anonymous agents who can acquire valuable information.
3these theorems do not consider the possibility that rational agents will use the market price
as a basis for decision making.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of related work.
Section 3 introduces the modeling framework to be used throughout the paper. To illustrate
the structure of our models, we consider the situation of a proﬁt-maximizing farmer, who
must choose how much eﬀort to invest in caring for her ﬁelds. The farmer can improve
her eﬀort decision by learning from the equilibrium price in a rainfall futures market. We
formalize the farmer’s problem in a general model of a securities market for decision-relevant
information when there are only rational informed traders. In section 4, we add further
realism to the model by examining the equilibrium when there is an additional securities
trader whose payoﬀ depends on the allocation decision. Section 5 highlights key ﬁndings
and discusses areas for future research.
2 Literature Review
Our treatment of decision market liquidity draws heavily on important results in ﬁnance.
Milgrom and Stokey’s (1982) no-trade theorem is particularly relevant because it provides
conditions under which no transactions will occur in securities markets. Our model gives
rise to trade because the decision maker has an additional motivation for trading in the
securities market. The information she obtains from this market is then used to increase her
production proﬁts. In this respect, our model is related to Glosten (1989) who argues that a
monopolist specialist may provide more liquidity than a competitive market maker because
the competitive market maker must always break even on his trades. The main diﬀerence is
that our model does not require any liquidity traders to keep the market open because the
decision maker in our model can aﬀord to always lose money on her trades.
We consider a securities market that is organized by either a competitive market maker
or a decision maker whose trading proﬁts are constrained by competitive entry. We adopt
our notion of securities market directly from Kyle (1985), who deﬁnes the inverse of liquidity
as the price impact of aggregate order ﬂow; however, we extend the Kyle (1985) model to
include a new type of trader, the decision maker, who values the information embedded
in informed traders’ order ﬂow. The introduction of this additional trader is also the key
diﬀerence between our models and Milgrom and Stokey’s (1982) model.
O u rm o d e ll e a d st oat r a d e - o ﬀ between the costs of providing liquidity and the beneﬁts
of obtaining information similar to Holmstrom and Tirole (1993). Although both models
4consider a proﬁt-maximizing risk neutral decision maker, the decision maker in our model
directly subsidizes securities market liquidity–and she does so in the presence of a com-
petitive market maker, even when there are no traders with exogenous liquidity motives.
In Holmstrom and Tirole (1993), the ﬁrm owner indirectly subsidizes liquidity by issuing
underpriced capital to traders with exogenous liquidity needs, which would not be possible
if either a competitive market maker participates in the initial public oﬀering or there are
no liquidity traders. In contrast, our model applies to competitive secondary equity markets
where there is frictionless arbitrage. Moreover, our model predicts there will be some trade
even when there are no liquidity traders because of the special role of the decision maker.
Our ﬁrst model consists of a decision maker and a ﬁnite number of informed traders,
who can acquire information about the production output from the decision maker’s eﬀort.
There is a market for securities that pay an amount related to the decision maker’s production
output. Following Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), we assume that informed traders optimally
choose how much information to acquire about the payoﬀ of the security based on their
expected trading proﬁts and the cost of acquiring information.
Our second model includes the decision maker, an informed trader, and a stakeholder
whose payoﬀ depends directly on the eﬀort allocation decision. The results on liquidity in
this model build on Kumar and Seppi (1992). Our stakeholder model also resembles the
model of price manipulation developed by Hanson and Oprea (2004), except that our model
explicitly links allocation decisions to information market prices. By making this linkage, we
can identify how the decision maker should design an information market to maximize her
welfare.
There are several papers in ﬁnance that study the interaction between allocative eﬃciency
in the real economy and informational eﬃciency in securities markets, including Diamond
(1980, Chapter 1), Dow and Gorton (1997), and Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999). Our
main contribution is to examine the impact of this interaction on securities market liquidity.
Most papers that address liquidity assume exogenous liquidity (or noise) traders, whereas
we treat liquidity as an endogenous variable determined by rational agents.
In a somewhat diﬀerent context and framework, Sherman and Titman (2002) examine a
similar question to ours. The authors examine the bookbuilding process for an IPO order
book, assuming that an underwriter cares about how accurately he prices an issue. Sher-
man and Titman (2002) ﬁnd that underwriters who care most about accuracy will tend to
underprice issues by the most. Their idea is similar in spirit to the liquidity subsidy idea
embodied in this paper.
5Our description of the conditions under which trade will occur in securities markets is
related to earlier work by Diamond (1980, Chapter 1) and concurrent work by Bond and
Eraslan (2005). Both papers make the point that trade in securities markets can occur when
it releases information that is socially valuable for resource allocation, but both models diﬀer
from ours in one important respect. A common feature of the models in Diamond (1980)
a n dB o n da n dE r a s l a n( 2 0 0 5 )i st h a tt h ee ﬃcient owner of the productive asset is unknown
in advance. This means that the existence of trade in their models depends crucially on
which agent possesses valuable production information and the agents’ initial endowments
of the asset. Both Diamond (1980) and Bond and Eraslan (2005) interpret their models as
describing the transfer of a controlling interest in a corporation.
A concurrent paper by Dow, Goldstein and Guembel (2006) starts from a similar premise
to ours that information may be underprovided in a securities market. These authors argue
that ﬁrms would like to commit to over-investing in certain projects to encourage informa-
tion production by market participants. In our simple model, the decision maker has no
such incentive because the security payoﬀ is independent of the decision maker’s choice. In
general, however, the Dow, Goldstein and Guembel (2006) idea is a complementary means
for enhancing the informational eﬃciency of securities prices.
3 Markets with Only Rational Informed Traders
To illustrate the structure of the model, we consider the situation of a proﬁt-maximizing
farmer, who must choose how much planting eﬀort to put into her ﬁelds. We then formalize
the farmer’s problem by developing a general model of a securities market for production-
relevant information when there are only rational informed traders.
3.1 Example and Modeling Framework
T h ef a r m e r ’ sp r o ﬁt-maximizing quantity of planting eﬀort depends on an uncertain quantity
of rainfall in her county this year. For simplicity, we suppose that this particular farmer is
the only one who knows her land well enough to successfully produce crops, implying she is
the eﬃcient land owner. We restrict our attention to the class of rainfall contracts.6
6O n ep o s s i b l ej u s t i ﬁcation for this restriction is that the farmer’s production methods and total cash ﬂows
cannot be stipulated in a contract so that local rainfall is the only contractible variable.
6W i t h i nt h ef a r m e r ’ sl o c a lc o m m u n i t y ,s u p p o s et h a tt h e r ea r es e v e r a lw e a t h e re x p e r t s
who can acquire informative, but costly, signals about future local rainfall. We assume that
the experts’ payoﬀs do not directly depend on the farmer’s planting eﬀort decision, so they
have no particular reason to deceive the farmer. Furthermore, to motivate the need for an
anonymous market, we assume that it is too costly for the farmer to ﬁnd, recognize, and write
individually tailored contracts with these weather experts to obtain their rainfall signals.
Instead, the farmer could set up a market for contingent claims on rainfall that is open
to public participation at the local exchange. We consider a one-shot batch auction in which
market buy and sell orders for rainfall securities clear at a single price set by a market maker.
The owner of a rainfall security receives a payment proportional to realized local rainfall. In
this simple example, ignoring other agents with possible hedging motives, only the weather
experts would potentially want to participate in such a market. Everyone else in the local
community would be wary of adverse selection–uninformed agents would fear that they will
end up taking the other side of a transaction with the weather experts. Thus, it would seem
that a competitive market maker would be unwilling to supply any liquidity in such a market
and that the no-trade theorem of Milgrom and Stokey (1982) would apply.
Indeed, the theorem would apply if the farmer were precluded from participating in or
making the market. However, even though the farmer is uninformed, she may want to
p a r t i c i p a t ei nt h er a i n f a l lm a r k e tb e c a u s es h ec a nu s et h em a r k e tp r i c ea st h eb a s i sf o r
her planting eﬀort decision.7 Speciﬁcally, suppose the farmer acts as a market maker and
provides some amount of liquidity in the rainfall market. Anticipating that they could proﬁt
by trading on rainfall information, the weather experts would be willing to incur positive
costs to acquire such information. After observing their signals, the weather experts would
buy rainfall securities in proportion to their signal realizations, obtaining expected proﬁts
by trading with the farmer. Because the equilibrium rainfall price will depend on informed
traders’ orders, the price of rainfall can inform the farmer’s eﬀort allocation decision.
Thus, the beneﬁt of trading rainfall securities for the farmer is that the equilibrium
price provides valuable information. The reason is that informed traders will acquire useful
information when there is an uninformed agent (i.e., the farmer) who is willing to trade in
the market. The farmer is willing to incur expected trading losses in the rainfall market up
to the point where her expected marginal trading loss equals the expected marginal beneﬁt
7The price in the rainfall claims market could be used as an input to the farmer’s allocation decision
rather than as the sole basis for her decision. In our simple model, it is always optimal for the farmer to rely
exclusively on the securities price because she has no private information.
7from obtaining better information through the rainfall market price. Even in the absence
of noise traders or other traders whose payoﬀsd e p e n do nt h ef a r m e r ’ se ﬀort decision, there
will be trading in the rainfall market between the farmer and the informed traders.
In section 4, we add further realism to the model by examining the equilibrium when the
local community also includes a local merchant whose payoﬀsa l s od e p e n do nt h ef a r m e r ’ s
planting eﬀort decision. The farmer does not know the local merchant’s objectives, but
is aware of the possibility that the merchant’s incentives are not perfectly aligned with
her own. In addition, the farmer cannot distinguish between the merchant whose payoﬀ
depends on her eﬀort allocation decision and a rainfall expert who has information about
the productivity of the farmer’s eﬀort. Because the equilibrium price of the rainfall security
will still convey valuable information about the productivity of her eﬀort, the farmer will
optimally use the price of rainfall to improve her eﬀort decision. However, now the farmer’s
usage of the price in her eﬀort decision gives the local merchant a reason to trade in the
rainfall market. For example, by buying rainfall securities, the local merchant can increase
the farmer’s expectation of rainfall, leading to an increase in the farmer’s eﬀort decision and
greater expected proﬁts for the local merchant.8 Of course, the farmer will anticipate that
the local merchant will attempt to inﬂuence her decision.
T h ed e s i r eo ft h el o c a lm e r c h a n tt oi n ﬂuence the farmer’s eﬀort decision can generate
trade in the rainfall security market. The local merchant and weather expert may end up
trading with one another if the expert’s rainfall signal opposes the local merchant’s planting
eﬀort objectives. In addition, because the merchant is submitting buy and sell orders in the
rainfall market without any private information about rainfall, a competitive market maker
would be willing to provide some amount of liquidity in the rainfall market. The existence
of a trader with particular decision objectives mitigates the adverse selection problem and
generates some trade.
When the local merchant’s decision objectives are not strong and there is little trade in
the securities market, the farmer will again subsidize liquidity to gather valuable information
from the rainfall expert. In general, the farmer’s intervention in the market does not depend
on her ability to act as a market maker. Even if the farmer only had the option to trade
with a competitive market maker, she would still choose to subsidize liquidity by submitting
a random order (similar to a noise trader), which we prove formally in subsection 4.1.
8We also allow the farmer to anticipate that the local merchant will attempt to inﬂuence her expectations.
Only unexpected trades will have an impact on the farmer’s rainfall expectations.
8In our formal analysis, we assume that there is an informative signal about eﬀort pro-
ductivity that can be veriﬁed ex post. In the example above, a farmer’s choice of planting
eﬀort in a given year may depend on her best forecast of annual rainfall. After a year has
elapsed, a veriﬁable productivity signal would be the annual rainfall measure reported by
t h eN a t i o n a lW e a t h e rS e r v i c ef o rt h ef a r m e r ’ sc o u n t y . 9
We now formalize the example by considering two models: one with N informed traders
and no decision stakeholder; and a second with one informed trader and one stakeholder.
The ﬁrst model with several informed traders illustrates that trade will occur even in the
“extreme” case in which only experts participate in the market. The second model, which
adds a decision stakeholder, shows how a stakeholder changes the equilibrium properties of
the model. We ﬁrst present those aspects of the decision maker’s problem that are common
to both models. This is followed by a detailed analysis of the equilibrium properties of both
models.
We consider a securities market for contingent contracts, each yielding an uncertain
amount y, which is related to the realized productivity of the decision maker’s eﬀort. We
assume that there are at most three types of agents who may participate in the securities
market: the decision maker, traders who have private information about the her decision’s
payoﬀs, and an uninformed competitive market maker. In this model, however, we will show
that the competitive market maker will not participate because he can only operate at a
loss.
A decision maker will undertake a certain level of eﬀort (x) based on her best forecast
of her eﬀort’s productivity (y). Initially, all experts and the decision maker have a normally
distributed prior belief about y, which we normalize so that E(y)=0and Va r(y) ≡ V0.10
The informed trader who observes a noisy signal of eﬀort productivity has no inherent
interest in the eﬀort level selected (x). Before the market opens, each informed trader i
9Some readers may doubt that such a veriﬁable signal exists in many private sector and public sector
applications. For example, consider a decision maker who wants to know the causal impact of a tax cut
on gross domestic product (GDP). Ex ante measurement of the causal eﬀect would seem to require that
an observer re-run history with and without the tax cut to measure the diﬀerence in GDP. Wolfers and
Zitzewitz (2006) propose a solution to this problem that relies on instrumental variables.
In a related article that we are writing, we show that even causal eﬀects are amenable to the modeling
framework applied in this article. Speciﬁcally, allowing the signal to depend on the decision maker’s choice
does not change our models’ main qualitative results. To simplify the models in this paper, we assume that
the realization of decision-relevant information (e.g., rainfall) is independent of the decision maker’s choice
(e.g., the farmer’s planting eﬀort decision).
10A downside of the normal distribution assumption is that negative productivity realizations are possible.
When the mean is suﬃciently high relative to the standard deviation, such realizations become extremely
unlikely.
9observes an independent normally distributed private informative signal (si)t h a tr e v e a l s
further information about y,w h e r eE(si|y)=y and Va r(si|y) ≡ Vi. Without loss of
generality, we also assume the signal si and the prior belief are independent conditional
on y. After observing signal si, each informed trader updates his posterior mean of y to
E(y|si)=
V0si













¢−1 <V 0. Before the market opens, each informed trader can acquire information
with a relative precision of vi at a cost of c(vi)=cv
2 v2
i.
Both the decision maker and the informed traders are risk-neutral, so they will maximize
their expected total proﬁts. The decision maker’s total proﬁts depend on both her production
and trading activities. Her production proﬁts come from two sources: she incurs a quadratic
eﬀort cost (x2) and her production revenues are equal to twice the product of eﬀort and
productivity (2xy). Thus, her total production proﬁts (πP0) can be expressed as:
πP0 =2 xy − x
2
These assumptions imply that the solution to the decision maker’s expected proﬁt-maximization
problem is:
x = E[y|p] (1)
where p is the securities market price that she observes. Thus, we assume that the decision
maker cannot commit to a suboptimal eﬀo r td e c i s i o na f t e ro b s e r v i n gt h em a r k e tc l e a r i n g
price. Letting the error in the decision maker’s productivity forecast be y − E[y|p]=δ,
where Va r(δ)=Vδ and E[yδ]=0 , we can express the maximized value of her expected
production proﬁts (πP)a s :
π
Max
P0 = E[2y(y − δ) − (y − δ)
2]=V0 − Vδ (2)
Note that the decision maker’s maximized production proﬁts are equal to the diﬀerence
between her expected forecast error before observing the price (V0)m i n u sh e re x p e c t e d
forecast error after observing the price (Vδ). We refer to this improvement in her forecast as
the informativeness of prices (I):
I = V0 − Vδ = π
Max
P0 (3)
Equation (3) says that the decision maker increases her maximized expected production
10proﬁts by reducing the noise in her productivity information (Vδ). Our general results will
hold whenever maximized expected production proﬁts increase with the quality of produc-
tivity information. In the example above, the farmer receives greater maximized expected
production proﬁts when her forecast is closer to realized rainfall because she can then im-
plement a better production plan.
The decision maker also receives proﬁts from trading in the securities market. We assume
that traders are anonymous in the sense that the market maker only sees the aggregate order
ﬂow.11 Traders submit market orders to a market maker who sets a clearing price in a batch
auction. We will consider the equilibrium under both a competitive market maker (as in Kyle
(1985)) and the decision maker making the market.12 Both market makers set a securities
price p in response to aggregate order ﬂow Q from traders. The decision maker can only
make the market if she oﬀers traders a better price than a competitive market maker.
Each informed trader submits his market order qi before he knows the equilibrium price,
but after viewing his private signal s. Total order ﬂow Q comes from the anonymous traders,
which may include informed rational traders and uninformed decision stakeholders. In the
ﬁrst version of the model, we allow the decision maker herself to make the market, but only
if she can attract order ﬂow by oﬀering better prices than the competitive market maker.
Following Kyle (1985), we only search for equilibria in which the price (p) depends linearly
on aggregate order ﬂow (Q)s ot h a tp(Q)=λQ.13 Aggregate order ﬂow consists of just the
informed traders’ orders (qi) in the case where the decision maker is the market maker, but
it may also contain the decision maker’s order (q0) in the case where the competitive market
maker sets prices.
The expected trading proﬁts of the decision maker (πT0) and informed traders (πTi)h a v e
as i m i l a rf o r m :
πT0(q0)=Ey [q0(y − p(Q(q0))] (4)
πTi(qi)=Ey [qi(y − p(Q(qi))|si] (5)
The only diﬀerence lies in the quantity demanded by each trader and the information sets.
Thus, the decision maker’s total expected proﬁt π0 is the sum of πMax
P0 and πT0 in equations
11Of course, when only two agents trade in equilibrium, each trader can infer the identity of the other.
When there are more than two traders, there is a non-degenerate inference problem.
12The decision maker could make the market herself, or contract out that responsibility to a ﬁrm that
specializes in that task.
13In all the linear equilibria in this paper, the constants in the pricing rule, eﬀort decision rule, and trading
strategies must be zero as a result of our maintained assumption that the common prior estimate of y is
zero.
11(2) and (4), respectively. The total proﬁt for each informed trader is the diﬀerence between
his trading proﬁts, πTi(qi), and his information acquisition cost, which is described below.
Each informed trader can acquire a signal si = y+εi,w h e r ey ∼ N(0,V 0) with V0 > 0,a n d
εi ∼ N(0,V i) independent of y. By incurring a greater cost, the informed trader can improve
his signal of si–i.e., he can decrease the variance of the distribution of si.I np a r t i c u l a r ,w e
assume there is an increasing, convex cost cv
2 v2
i of acquiring a signal with relative precision
vi,w h e r evi = V0
V0+Vi. This assumption is inspired by the classic Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)
model of information acquisition. Note that we can think of the informed trader as choosing
vi indirectly through his choice of Vi.
3.2 Formal Model with Only Informed Traders
Following Kyle (1985), we look for a Nash equilibrium in which the market maker uses the
pricing rule:
p = λQ (6)
where Q = QI =
X
i
qIi. W ed e p a r tf r o mK y l eb ye x a m i n i n gt h ed e c i s i o nm a k e r ’ se ﬀort
choice, which will be given by the linear rule:
x = kp (7)
where k is determined so that the decision maker’s optimal eﬀo r tr u l ei ne q u a t i o n( 1 )i s
satisﬁed.
In addition, we look for a symmetric equilibrium in which all informed traders submit
linear strategies of the form:
qi = bIsi (8)
where bI is the same for all informed traders i. To determine what quality of signal he
will acquire, each informed trader i must ﬁrst solve his proﬁt maximization problem for a
given signal quality (vi)a n dﬁxed trading strategies b−I of the other informed traders. After
already incurring the cost of acquiring information, the informed trader maximizes expected
trading proﬁts ignoring the sunk acquisition cost. Anticipating these maximized expected
proﬁts, the informed trader can now select his optimal degree of information acquisition (vi).
The last step in identifying the equilibrium is to solve for the decision maker’s optimal
pricing rule. In a Nash equilibrium, her pricing rule and the trading strategies of all informed
12traders are mutual best responses. Proposition 1 summarizes the equilibrium strategies
followed by the decision maker and informed traders:
Proposition 1 The decision maker sets a linear pricing rule p = λQ, which involves ex-
pected trading losses (πT0 < 0), whereas a competitive market maker would refuse to operate.
The decision maker selects an eﬀort allocation (x) that is proportional to the equilibrium
price in the securities market–i.e., x = kp,w h e r e1 <k<2. Because informed traders
choose their demands (qIi) in the securities market to be proportional to their signal realiza-
tions (si), the equilibrium securities market price and the decision maker’s eﬀort allocation
are proportional to the sum of informed traders’ signals.14
Proof: See Appendix.
The most important point in Proposition 1 is that the decision maker is willing to operate
at a loss, whereas the competitive market maker would not. Intuitively, with only rational
informed traders participating in the market, the competitive market maker’s zero proﬁt
condition can only be satisﬁed when he does not trade. This conﬁrms the Milgrom and
Stokey (1982) “no trade” result for the case in which the decision maker does not participate
in the market. In this equilibrium, anticipating that they cannot proﬁt from their trades,
informed agents would acquire zero costly information (vi =0 ).
By contrast, the decision maker’s liquidity provision leads to an equilibrium with some
trading, which allows informed traders to proﬁt from their information acquisition. The
decision maker tolerates an expected trading loss in the securities market because she learns
valuable information from the equilibrium price. In particular, the decision maker links
her eﬀort choice to the equilibrium price, which contains information about her eﬀort’s
productivity. This decision linkage results in an expected increase in her production proﬁts
that outweighs the expected decrease in her trading proﬁts. Thus, there is nothing irrational
about the decision maker’s securities market trading.
One interpretation of the decision maker’s pricing rule is that the equilibrium securities
price underreacts to the information contained in insiders’ market orders. Consider the
following three period interpretation of our model. In period 0, before agents have observed
their signals, all agents have a common prior expectation of y equal to 0, implying that
p0 =0is the initial price that would prevail in period 0. In period 1, after informed agents
have observed their signals and submitted their market orders, the securities market clearing
14In a more general model where informed traders may acquire signals with diﬀerent precisions, the
equilibrium securities price would be proportional to a precision-weighted sum of their signals.
13price is given by p1 = λQ as noted in Proposition 1. In period 2, all agents owning the
security receive the liquidating dividend equal to y, implying that p2 = y. This means that
t h ec o v a r i a n c eb e t w e e nt h et w oc h a n g e si np r i c ei s :
Cov(p2 − p1,p 1 − p0)=−λπT0 > 0 (9)
where the equality uses equation (4) and the inequality uses Proposition 1.
In other words, price changes display positive serial correlation. If an outside observer
sees the ﬁrst change in price is positive, he would expect to observe another positive change
in price. Prices do not fully adjust to insiders’ information as they would in a competitive
equilibrium because p1 = λQ is insuﬃciently sensitive to order ﬂow relative to the hypothet-
ical price that a competitive market maker would set p1 = λcQ with λc >λ .T h i si sj u s ta
restatement of our main result that the decision maker subsidizes liquidity.
The decision maker sets prices to underreact to order ﬂow so that informed traders have
incentives to acquire information. Securities must be undervalued when insiders have positive
signals; and they must be overvalued when insiders have negative signals. If securities
were not mispriced, then insiders would have no incentive to acquire information. This
argument is analogous to the Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) idea that informationally eﬃcient
markets are an impossibility. In our model, the decision maker deliberately makes the market
informationally ineﬃcient in order to motivate information acquisition.15
The underreaction of prices is only an instantaneous phenomenon that applies to the
moment in which insiders act on their information. After insiders complete their trades, the
market clearing price fully reveals their information because it is proportional to the sum of
their signals. This implies that all future prices will incorporate insiders’ information. For
example, if we added another period just after period 1 in the three-period model above,
then the market clearing price in this later period would fully respond to all the information
revealed in period 1. The decision maker would have no incentive to subsidize liquidity in
this later period unless informed traders had acquired new signals.
The idea of using a liquidity subsidy to obtain better information could also be extended
to a dynamic framework. For example, an decision maker could post a narrower bid-ask
15This ineﬃciency persists in equilibrium even if we introduce uninformed traders in the model. The
nature of the batch auction mechanism in Kyle (1985) only allows simple market order submission strategies.
Uninformed traders would always choose to submit zero quantity orders in our model. If we had instead
allowed traders to submit price schedules, then this would change the equilibrium. We discuss limit orders
and one possible dynamic version of our model later in the paper.
14spread than a competitive market maker to allow informed traders to obtain positive expected
proﬁts, which would motivate them to acquire information. Only informed traders with
better information than the decision maker would beneﬁt from the liquidity subsidy. No
uninformed trader could take advantage of the decision maker’s subsidy because she would
adjust her quotes immediately after each informed order. Thus, even in a dynamic model, a
liquidity subsidy is a viable means for providing incentives to acquire information. Moreover,
without a subsidy, it is unclear how any information would ever be revealed in prices (in a
model lacking traders with hedging or irrational motives).
The following proposition summarizes the comparative statics of equilibrium information
acquisition (v), liquidity (λ
−1), and dollar amount of the liquidity subsidy.
Proposition 2 The size of the liquidity subsidy is larger, prices are more informative, each
informed trader acquires more information, and the market is (weakly) less liquid when there
is more uncertainty about productivity. Each informed trader acquires less information and
the market is (weakly) more liquid when there are more informed traders and when there
are higher costs of acquiring information. In general, the size of the liquidity subsidy may
increase or decrease when there are more informed traders and when there are higher infor-
mation acquisition costs. Price informativeness decreases when there are higher information
acquisition costs and may increase or decrease when there are more informed traders.
Proof:S e eA p p e n d i x .
Proposition 2 makes two main points. First, the decision maker subsidizes liquidity to
induce informed traders to acquire better signals, which will improve the decision maker’s
production proﬁts. Consistent with this intuition, the liquidity subsidy is largest when there
is more uncertainty about her eﬀort’s productivity. Second, equilibrium market liquidity is
lower when informed traders acquire better information, which happens when the expected
proﬁts from acquiring information are high relative to the costs. In this regard, the decision
maker’s market making activity is similar to a competitive market maker’s activity. The
intuition comes from Kyle’s (1985) insight that a market maker decreases liquidity in markets
with informative order ﬂow to limit her losses. Nevertheless, the decision maker is willing to
accept some losses in order to inform her eﬀort choice.
The proposition also describes the properties of equilibrium price informativeness. Recall
that price informativeness measures expected production proﬁts because the decision maker
implements a production plan based on the equilibrium market clearing price. Thus, in the
situations in which information is most important for production (i.e.,w h e nu n c e r t a i n t y
15in productivity is greatest), the decision maker attains greater expected production proﬁts.
The intuition for this result comes from a well-known property of maximized expected proﬁt
functions: they tend to increase with parameter uncertainty. Because the decision maker can
decrease her eﬀo r tw h e ne x p e c t e de ﬀort productivity is low, she can diminish the impact
of negative shocks to expected eﬀort productivity. Moreover, the decision maker can take
advantage of favorable expected productivity shocks by increasing her eﬀort. Note that
this argument relies on the decision maker having some information about the expected
productivity shock. Thus, the decision maker’s willingness to subsidize liquidity in the
securities market, which informs her eﬀort choice, increases when there is greater uncertainty
in eﬀort productivity.
Proposition 2 shows that the decision maker provides more liquidity in the securities
market when there are more informed traders. This occurs because each trader acquires
less precise information, which mitigates the adverse selection problem faced by the decision
maker. However, it is unclear whether the total size of the liquidity subsidy increases or
decreases as N increases because the decision maker subsidizes more traders, but each trader
acquires less precise information.
We can now assess whether the no-trade equilibrium or the equilibrium with the decision
maker as the market maker is more desirable from a social standpoint. We deﬁne the social
welfare function as equal to the expected production revenues conditional on information
revealed by the equilibrium price minus informed traders’ costs of acquiring that level of
information. We disregard the total trading proﬁts of informed traders and the decision
maker because they must sum to zero.
The social welfare maximization problem is almost identical to the maximization problem
solved by the decision maker. The only diﬀerence comes from the fact that informed traders
have some market power, earning abnormal proﬁts above and beyond their information
acquisition costs. The decision maker must bear not only the direct acquisition costs, but
also the cost of paying the informed traders’ expected proﬁts. Proposition 3 summarizes our
results on social welfare maximization. The proposition refers to three diﬀerent equilibria:
1) the social equilibrium is the one selected by a social planner maximizing production
proﬁts; 2) the private equilibrium is the equilibrium that prevails when the decision maker
maximizes her total production and trading proﬁts; and 3) the competitive equilibrium is
the hypothetical situation in which the decision maker does not participate in the securities
market.
16Proposition 3 Expected welfare and liquidity are higher at the social optimum than when the
decision maker subsidizes liquidity in the securities market. Similarly, welfare and liquidity
are higher when the decision maker subsidizes liquidity than in the case of a competitive
market maker.
Proof:S e eA p p e n d i x .
The main point of Proposition 3 is that the decision maker’s liquidity subsidy improves
social welfare. In one sense, this may seem obvious because the competitive equilibrium
without a liquidity subsidy would entail no trade and no acquisition of productivity informa-
tion, which is clearly undesirable for the economy. This reasoning overlooks the possibility
that the decision maker will excessively subsidize information acquisition relative to the so-
cial optimum. However, in the simple model here, the decision maker’s incentive to increase
information acquisition is well-aligned with society’s goals because the decision maker is the
sole residual claimant of production surplus and there is no consumer surplus.16
In fact, the decision maker’s subsidy is insuﬃcient to lead to optimal information acquisi-
tion. A straightforward interpretation is that ea c hi n f o r m e dt r a d e rw i t hp r i v a t ei n f o r m a t i o n
has market power and restricts the quantity of information below the social optimum to
maximize his private proﬁts. The only reason the equilibrium does not attain the social
optimum is that each informed trader recognizes his inﬂuence on the equilibrium price.
We conclude that the decision maker improves social welfare by subsidizing liquidity
and motivating information acquisition when the competitive equilibrium falls short. The
decision maker always subsidizes liquidity in this model to improve the informativeness of
prices, especially when information is particularly important for her production planning.17
4 Markets with Decision Stakeholders
In this section, we investigate the equilibrium in a decision market when there is a stake-
holder and an informed trader. To focus our attention on the stakeholder’s impact on the
16This result on the underprovision of liquidity and information may be more general than our simple
model suggests. Improved production information will tend to increase the size of producer and consumer
surplus. If the farmer neglects the potential increase in consumer surplus or does not receive all of the
increase in producer surplus, she may have even less of an incentive to acquire production information.
17In related work, we have also shown that adding noise traders to this model does not change the main
comparative statics. The asset owner subsidizes liquidity when there are suﬃciently few noise traders.
Again, the decision maker’s liquidity subsidy improves social welfare, but does not supply enough liquidity
to motivate the socially optimal level of information acquisition.
17equilibrium, we streamline the rest of the model. Speciﬁcally, we assume that there is only
one informed trader (N =1 ) who can acquire information at no cost (cv =0 ), implying that
he will acquire perfect information in equilibrium (i.e., v =1 ).
We introduce a new trader to the model who has a direct stake in the decision maker’s
eﬀort choice. Suppose that the stakeholder receives production proﬁts equal to πPM(x)=θx,
where θ describes the marginal beneﬁt or cost of a change in the decision maker’s eﬀort choice.
In general, one can think of the stakeholder as a consumer, competing producer, or even an
employee. We assume the marginal beneﬁt parameter (θ) is private information for the
stakeholder. We also assume for tractability that all other agents have prior beliefs that the
stakeholder’s decision objective θ is normally distributed as N(0,V θ).
We begin by comparing the equilibrium in the model when the decision maker does not
intervene in the market to the equilibrium in which the decision maker subsidizes liquidity
in the market. In both cases, we look for an equilibrium in which the market maker’s price
depends linearly on order ﬂow as in equation (6), the decision maker’s eﬀo r tr u l ed e p e n d s
linearly on the securities market price as in equation (7), and the informed trader’s order
depends linearly on his private signal as in equation (8). In addition, we conjecture that the
stakeholder will submit an order (qM) that depends linearly on his decision objective (θ):18
qM = bMθ (10)
Before analyzing the equilibria of this model, we oﬀer an intuitive explanation of the two
key exogenous parameters in the model: Vθ and V0.W e i n t e r p r e t Vθ as the stakeholder’s
expected “willingness to trade.” When Vθ is larger, other agents believe that the stakeholder
is more likely to have a high or a low value of θ. A high or low value of θ means that
the stakeholder will receive a larger payoﬀ from moving the price either above or below
the security’s expected payoﬀ. From the informed trader’s perspective, an increase in the
stakeholder’s (expected) willingness to buy or sell the security at prices that deviate from the
security’s expected payoﬀ represents a larger proﬁt opportunity. Speciﬁcally, the informed
trader’s expected payoﬀ depends on the value of Vθ.
Just as Vθ determines how much other agents expect to proﬁt from trading with the
stakeholder, V0 determines how much money other agents expect to lose from trading with
the informed trader. The parameter V0 measures the “informational advantage” of the
18There is also a symmetric linear equilibrium in which there are many identical informed traders and
stakeholders. Symmetric refers to the fact that all traders of the same type use the same quantity strategy,
but do not necessarily submit the same actual quantities.
18informed trader, who has perfect information in this model–i.e., it captures the diﬀerence
between the informed trader’s expected forecast error (0) and other agents’ expected forecast
error (V0). We can think of the ratio of the stakeholder’s expected willingness to trade to the
informed trader’s informational advantage (V0/Vθ) as a measure of the severity of adverse
selection in the securities market. When the informed trader’s informational advantage is
greater and when the stakeholder is less willing to trade, the adverse selection problem in
t h em a r k e ti sm o r es e v e r e .
First, we analyze the equilibrium for the hypothetical case in which the market maker
is competitive and the decision maker does not participate in the securities market (by
assumption). However, the decision maker can still use the equilibrium price as an input
for her eﬀort rule. Proposition 4 characterizes the competitive market maker’s equilibrium
pricing rule, the decision maker’s eﬀort rule, along with traders’ equilibrium strategies:
Proposition 4 If the decision maker did not participate in the securities market, a com-
petitive securities market maker would set λc =
p
V0/Vθ when Vθ > 0 and refuse to operate
otherwise. The decision maker’s equilibrium eﬀort rule would be x = p and the competitive
m a r k e tm a k e rw o u l du s eap r i c i n gr u l eo fp = 1
2(s+
p
V0/Vθθ). A competitive market maker
would supply more liquidity (λ
−1
c is higher) when the stakeholder is more willing to trade (Vθ
increases) and when the informed trader has a lower informational advantage (V0 decreases).
The informativeness of the securities price would be V0/2. The informed trader would follow
the strategy qI =
√
Vθ/V0
2 s and the stakeholder would follow the trading strategy qM = 1
2θ
when Vθ/V0 > 0. Otherwise, both traders would not trade.
Proof:S e eA p p e n d i x .
Unlike the model in section 3, there would always be some trade in the competitive
equilibrium unless Vθ =0 . The reason is that the decision stakeholder would trade because
he receives a private marginal beneﬁt( θ)f r o mi n ﬂuencing the decision. In equilibrium, the
decision maker links her eﬀort to the market price because the price is informative about
eﬀort productivity (y). In this sense, the stakeholder in our model can be viewed as an
endogenous noise trader as in Kumar and Seppi (1992). Without a trader who beneﬁts from
inﬂuencing the decision maker’s eﬀort choice, there would be no trade in the competitive
equilibrium.
19Because the competitive market maker would set equilibrium liquidity to increase monoton-
ically with the ratio Vθ/V0, we interpret this ratio as the “natural liquidity” of the market.19
This is the level of liquidity that would prevail in the hypothetical benchmark situation
where the decision maker did not participate in a securities market with a competitive mar-
ket maker–e.g., the traditional Kyle (1985) model. The ratio Vθ/V0 increases as the adverse
selection problem becomes less severe, which occurs when either the stakeholder becomes
more willing to trade or the informational advantage of the informed trader decreases.
In the competitive equilibrium, the decision maker would implement an eﬀort allocation
that is solely based on the equilibrium securities price (x = p) because this price includes all
relevant information about her eﬀort’s productivity. By linking her eﬀort to the equilibrium
price, the decision maker could incur a loss in production proﬁt sf r o mt h ef a c tt h a tt h e
stakeholder’s trading activity aﬀects her decision. Interestingly, this does not happen because
the informed trader trades more aggressively when he expects that the stakeholder is more
willing to trade. So the stakeholder’s expected willingness to trade would have no impact
on price informativeness in the competitive equilibrium. This result will not hold in a more
general model in which we allow the decision maker to intervene in the market.
We can compare the hypothetical competitive equilibrium to the equilibrium in the se-
curities market when the decision maker is the market maker. Once again, we allow the
decision maker to link her eﬀort allocation to the equilibrium market price. The following
proposition summarizes the properties of this equilibrium:
Proposition 5 The decision maker is willing to subsidize liquidity (i.e., set λ<λ c)i nt h e
securities market in situations where natural liquidity is low (Vθ/V0 < 1). In these situations,
the decision maker incurs expected trading losses and sets her eﬀort rule such that x = kp
where 1 <k<2. However, the decision maker will not trade in the securities market when
natural liquidity is suﬃciently large (i.e., Vθ/V0 ≥ 1). In these situations, she incurs no
trading losses and sets her eﬀort rule such that k =1 . The decision maker’s liquidity subsidy
induces the informed agent and the stakeholder to trade more aggressively. The informed
trader’s increased aggressiveness dominates in the sense that price informativeness is greater
when the decision maker subsidizes liquidity.
Proof: See Appendix.
We explain the intuition for the increase in liquidity in the securities market by tracing the
impact on the decision maker’s production proﬁts. In a more liquid market, the informed
19Note that natural liquidity in the securities market is the inverse of the adverse selection measure
described above.
20trader trades more aggressively on his information because his trades do not move prices
(against himself) as much. In contrast, the stakeholder does not trade as aggressively,
recognizing that moving the price in a more liquid market would require a larger trade with
the informed agent and entail a greater expected loss. As a result, in a liquid market, a
greater proportion of aggregate order ﬂow comes from the informed agent, which increases
the informativeness of prices. Because the decision maker can use this more informative price
to form a better eﬀort rule, her expected production proﬁts are higher when the securities
market is more liquid. She is willing to incur some expected trading losses in the securities
market to increase her expected production proﬁts.
However, the cost of subsidizing liquidity increases as liquidity and trading volume in
the market increase. For a given departure from the equilibrium price, the expected trading
loss for the decision maker increases in proportion to the amount of securities traded. This
is why the decision maker is only willing to subsidize liquidity when there is less trading
volume in the market–i.e., when there is little natural liquidity (Vθ <V 0).
In this case, the decision maker sets prices to underreact to information in order for
informed traders to reap extra proﬁts from their trades. However, the decision maker’s
eﬀo r tr u l e( x = kp) is not biased. She appropriately adjusts for the underreaction in prices
by changing her eﬀo r tc h o i c em o r et h a no n e - f o r - o n e( k>1) in response to changes in prices.
The next proposition summarizes how the decision maker would respond to changes in
natural liquidity.20
Proposition 6 The decision maker’s liquidity provision in the securities market is greater
when natural liquidity is higher–i.e., dλ/d(Vθ/V0) < 0. The decision maker’s eﬀort choice
becomes less dependent on the securities price when natural liquidity is higher–i.e., dk/d(Vθ/V0) <
0.W h e nVθ/V0 < V< 1, the size of the decision maker’s liquidity subsidy (|λV − C|)i n -
creases when natural liquidity is higher. When V< V θ/V0 < 1, the size of the decision
maker’s liquidity subsidy (|λV − C|) decreases when natural liquidity is lower. The liquidity
subsidy increases the decision maker’s total proﬁts more when natural liquidity is lower.
Proof: See Appendix.
20Although we could analyze how liquidity provision changes when both Vθ and V0 change, this would be
somewhat redundant. Because the asset owner’s total proﬁts depend only on the ratio of Vθ/V0,P r o p o s i t i o n
6 describes how liquidity and the decision rule vary with this ratio. The dependence of the decision maker’s
strategy on the ratio Vθ/V0 completely summarizes the dependence on both of the individual parameters (Vθ
and V0) because both parameters are exogenous–i.e., one is always held ﬁxed when the other one changes.
21The ﬁrst result in Proposition 6 is identical to the competitive market maker case. Anal-
ogous to Kyle (1985), when the stakeholder is expected to trade more, adverse selection is
less of a problem, which increases securities market liquidity. Similarly, an increase in the
informed trader’s informational advantage increases the adverse selection problem, which
decreases market liquidity. However, there is a cost associated with more stakeholder trade
and less informed trade: the price becomes a noisier signal of productivity, so the decision
maker relies less on the price when she chooses her eﬀort.
Proposition 6 also describes a non-monotonic relationship between the size of the liquidity
subsidy and natural liquidity in the market. One interpretation is that the decision maker’s
liquidity subsidy and the stakeholder’s willingness to trade are two ways of making the
securities market more liquid. The decision maker would like to make the market more
liquid when it will not cost her much and it will improve the informativeness of prices.
When the stakeholder is quite reluctant to trade (Vθ is low), trading volume in the market is
quite low, which means it is not very costly for the decision maker to subsidize liquidity. An
increase in the stakeholder’s expected willingness to trade leads to a larger liquidity subsidy
because this reduces the stakeholder’s inﬂuence on the price at a reasonable cost (because
volume is low). When the stakeholder’s expected eagerness to inﬂuence the decision becomes
strong enough (Vθ is high), trading volume in the market is relatively high, which means that
subsidizing liquidity is quite expensive. In this case, the decision maker responds to increases
in expected stakeholder trade by allowing the stakeholder to absorb some of the costs of
supplying liquidity. In other words, when the decision maker expects more stakeholder
trade, the liquidity provided by the stakeholder and the decision maker are substitutes.
Another important point in Proposition 6 is that the decision maker’s intervention in-
creases her total proﬁts more when natural liquidity is lower. In other words, the change
in her total proﬁts is greatest when the competitive market maker would provide the least
liquidity. The intuition is that only a small liquidity subsidy is necessary to enhance price
informativeness, which increases the decision maker’s production proﬁts. When natural liq-
uidity is low, this means there is very little stakeholder trade. A small liquidity subsidy will
increase informed trade by a small amount, which will still have a big eﬀect on the relative
amount of informed trade. This is the key variable for price informativeness and the deci-
sion maker’s total proﬁts. When her expected liquidity subsidy is small, the decision maker
receives a very large expected return on her subsidy.
Although it is clear that the decision maker is better oﬀ when she is allowed to intervene
in the securities market, it is not clear whether her intervention beneﬁts society. We can
22evaluate social welfare as the sum of the expected production proﬁts of the decision maker
and the expected non-trading proﬁts of the stakeholder. In this model, social welfare does
not include information acquisition costs because these are assumed to be zero.
We can compare social welfare at the hypothetical competitive equilibrium in which
the decision maker does not intervene, at the equilibrium in which the decision maker sets
liquidity in the securities market, and at the social optimum when a social planner sets
liquidity in the securities market. The next proposition summarizes these social welfare
comparisons, focusing on the most interesting cases in which the decision maker would
intervene in the market (Vθ/V0 < 1).
Proposition 7 Whenever there is little natural liquidity (Vθ/V0 < 1), expected welfare and
liquidity are higher at the social optimum than when the decision maker intervenes in the
securities market. Similarly, welfare and liquidity are higher with the decision maker’s inter-
vention than in the case of a competitive market maker. In addition, the increase in social
welfare from the decision maker’s intervention is greater when natural liquidity is lower.
Proof: See Appendix.
The competitive equilibrium entails the least liquidity because the competitive market
maker does not care about price informativeness, which is linked to the decision maker’s
production proﬁts. The decision maker’s liquidity subsidy improves upon social welfare in
the competitive outcome because the decision maker is trying to maximize her production
proﬁts, which are an important component of social welfare. However, the decision maker is
unwilling to subsidize liquidity enough to reach the socially optimal level because she must
bear some of the cost of giving the informed trader an incentive to reveal his information.
The informed trader restricts his trading because he recognizes his impact on the securities
price.
Proposition 7 also shows that the decision maker’s intervention improves social welfare
more when natural liquidity is lower. The intuition is similar to Proposition 6, which proves
the analogous result for the decision maker’s total proﬁts. Once again, when natural liquidity
is low, only a small liquidity subsidy is necessary to enhance price informativeness, which
improves social welfare.
4.1 Equilibrium When the Decision Maker Is a Trader
This section investigates possible strategies for the decision maker as a trader when there is
a competitive market maker. This situation could arise, say, if the decision maker were not
23allowed to be a market maker. In this case, the decision maker may want to submit buy
and sell orders in order to make the market more liquid, and thus get better information. In
a dynamic setting, this could be accomplished by posting simultaneous bid and ask orders
at a narrower spread than the market maker. In a static setting where traders only submit
market orders in a batch auction, it is less clear how the decision maker can achieve her
liquidity objectives.
We consider the possibility that the decision maker submits a random order to make
the market more liquid. Indeed, this is precisely the way that liquidity traders are modeled
in the standard Kyle (1985) model. In this “random trading model,” we will prove that
t h ea m o u n to fl i q u i d i t y( λ
−1) and the informed trading strategies are the same whether a
rational decision maker optimally trades in the market or optimally makes the market. The
proof of this result is quite general and applies to both the model with a stakeholder and
the model with no stakeholder.
Formally, consider a model in which the decision maker submits a random order ρ,w h e r e
ρ ∼ N(0,V ρ), to a competitive market maker. The decision maker selects the distribution
of the order, but cannot control the speciﬁc realization of her order. Because the single
parameter Vρ is a suﬃcient statistic for the distribution of ρ, we can think of the decision
maker as choosing Vρ. For simplicity, we suppose that only the decision maker can observe
the realization of ρ, which occurs after the order is submitted but before the market clears.
This will allow the decision maker to “debias” the market price by accounting for the eﬀect
of the realization of ρ. The competitive market maker only observes aggregate order ﬂow,
but is aware that the decision maker’s random order ﬂow is included in aggregate order
ﬂow.21 Order ﬂow may include orders from an arbitrary number of informed traders and a
stakeholder.
Proposition 8 T h ea m o u n to fl i q u i d i t y( λ
−1), the stakeholder trading strategy, and the
informed trading strategy are the same whether a rational decision maker optimally trades
in the market or optimally makes the market.
21In practice, writing a contract to enforce this random order would not be too diﬃcult. For example,
suppose a decision maker submits an order to buy ρ contracts, where ρ is the realization from a third-
party random-number generator. The distribution of ρ would need to be public, but the realization could
be public (e.g.,t h ep o i n td i ﬀerence in the SuperBowl) or private (e.g., the spin on a roulette wheel with
normally distributed values). The decision maker’s random order would need to be a binding contract with
the market maker that would be veriﬁed ex ante and enforced ex post by a neutral third party. Anticipating
the distribution of this random order will be a part of total order ﬂow, a competitive market maker would
lower the sensitivity of price to order ﬂow.
24Proof: See Appendix.
The main point of Proposition 8 is that both models’ predictions of how the decision
maker will participate in the market do not depend on the assumption that the decision
maker can act as a market maker. The proof shows that the decision maker can achieve the
same expected utility and equilibrium outcome by randomly trading in the market with a
competitive market maker.22
An interesting implication of Proposition 8 is that the decision maker can choose whether
she would like others to beneﬁt from the information provided by her liquidity subsidy. In
particular, if the decision maker reveals the realization of her random order ﬂow to other
agents, then these other agents can make more accurate inferences about the security’s
fundamental value (y). On the other hand, if the decision maker would rather keep her
information private, then she can do this, too. In our highly stylized model, the decision
maker is indiﬀerent to releasing the information to the public. In general, the choice of
whether to reveal her information will depend on the decision maker’s objectives.
5C o n c l u s i o n
Our model allows new insights into how securities markets are linked to resource allocation
decisions. We derive three key results. First, we show that a decision maker will subsidize
liquidity in illiquid decision markets to gather valuable decision-relevant information. In
our Kyle-type model, the decision maker always provides at least as much liquidity as a
competitive market maker and often provides more. There are even some situations in
which a competitive market maker would refuse to operate, but a decision maker would be
willing to supply some liquidity and incur expected trading losses. From the decision maker’s
perspective, some trade in a market for decision-relevant information is better than none. We
also show that the decision maker can implement her desired liquidity policy either directly
as the market maker or indirectly as a noise trader participating in a competitive market.
Second, we show that the decision maker’s intervention in the securities market enhances
social welfare. In general, without decision stakeholders, noise traders, or hedging demands,
there will be little trade in a securities market. In this case, informed traders will have
no incentive to acquire costly information or reveal it in prices. As a result, allocative
22Proposition 8 raises the interesting question of whether agents who behave as noise traders are doing
so to learn more from the market price. Before dismissing such agents as irrational, future theoretical and
empirical work should consider this possibility.
25eﬃciency suﬀers when there is insuﬃcient trade in the securities market. Fortunately, the
decision maker is willing to subsidize liquidity in the securities market to partially remedy
this situation. Unfortunately, her subsidy is typically not large enough to motivate the
socially optimal level of information acquisition and revelation in prices. The main problem
is that informed traders recognize the impact of their trades in imperfectly liquid markets.
They restrict the quantity of their trades, which increases their private proﬁts but harms
social welfare.
Third, our model demonstrates that the mere act of linking the decision to the market
price will typically enhance liquidity in the market. Thus, liquidity may be less of a problem
in decision markets than in traditional information or asset markets. In decision markets,
agents may choose to trade because they have strong decision objectives. Moreover, this
stakeholder trading is a substitute for the liquidity subsidy provided by a decision maker.
T h i sc a nb ec o m p a r e dw i t ht h em o r ec o n v e n t i o n a li n f o r m a t i o nm a r k e tc a s ei nw h i c he v e n
experts with decision objectives will not trade. In both markets, however, liquidity subsidies
may be useful for obtaining information. Although we derive special cases of optimal liquidity
subsidies in this paper, the form of the optimal subsidies in more general settings requires
further investigation.
We believe that information and decision markets are likely to become more prevalent
in the future. While we have developed a theory of how such markets could be designed
eﬃciently, it remains to be seen whether such mechanisms will actually work well in practice.
More research is needed to understand the properties of diﬀerent kinds of decision markets.
For example, little is known about the theoretical properties of decision markets in which
the decision itself has an impact on the realization of decision-relevant information. Ap-
plied research, including both laboratory and real-world experiments, can assess how robust
diﬀerent decision markets are in practice. Whereas information markets have been found
to forecast extremely well, decision markets have not been studied empirically. There are
compelling theoretical reasons to expect diﬀerent behavior in decision markets, but theory
alone cannot address this issue.
26Appendix
In the appendix, we prove Propositions 1 through 8.
Proof of Proposition 1: After already incurring the cost of acquiring information, the
informed trader maximizes expected trading proﬁts ignoring the sunk acquisition cost.
qi ∈ argmax
e qi
E(b qi(y − p)|si) (11)
where p = λQ = λQI = λ
X
i
qIi, which has the solution:
qi =
vi(1 − λb−I(N − 1))
2λ
si (12)
These are the informed trader’s expected trading proﬁts before si has been realized, but
after the distribution of si has been chosen. This expression for qi c a nb ec o m b i n e dw i t ho u r
symmetry assumption (bI = b−I)t os o l v ef o rbI:
bI =
vi(1 − λbI(N − 1))
2λ
(13)
which implies that all traders must be choosing the same degree of information precision
vi = v.
Next we assess whether this choice of information precision is consistent with each in-
dividual informed trader’s proﬁt maximization condition. Substituting the solution to the
proﬁt-maximization problem in equation (13) into the original maximand in equation (11),




(1 − λb−I(N − 1))
2 (14)













which has the solution:
vi =
V0(1 − λb−I(N − 1))2
4cvλ
(16)
27when V0(1 − λb−I(N − 1))2 < 4λcv and vi =1otherwise because vi ∈ [0,1].
To ensure that each informed trader is choosing a trading strategy that is a best response
to the actual trading strategies played by other informed traders, we solve for the value of
bI that satisﬁes equation (13) and our symmetry result that vi = v:
bI =
v
λ[(N − 1)v +2 ]
(17)
Using this equation along with equation (16), we can solve for the degree of information
precision that each informed trader will choose as a best response to all other informed
traders’ strategies:





Equation (18) establishes a one-to-one mapping between liquidity and the equilibrium
l e v e lo fi n f o r m a t i o np r e c i s i o na c q u i r e db yi n f o r m e dt r a d e r s ,w h i c hw ec a nc o n ﬁrm by showing






[3(N − 1)v + 2][(N − 1)v +2 ]
< 0 (19)
Now we can determine the trading proﬁts (πMM) of a market maker who sets λ.F i r s t ,






where we have introduced a new parameter Vε which corresponds to the common choice
of Vi that satisﬁes v = V0
V0+Vi = vi for all i. For convenience, we deﬁne V = Va r(Q) and
C = Cov(y,Q). From these equations and the equation for bI above, we can calculate the
trading proﬁts (πMM) of a market maker who sets a liquidity parameter λ:
πMM(λ)=E[−Q(y − p)] = λV − C = −
NvV0
λ[(N − 1)v +2 ] 2 < 0 (22)
assuming V0 > 0, 0 <v≤ 1 and λ>0. Thus, a competitive market maker will not be
willing to supply any liquidity in this securities market because he would never break even
on his trades.
28To solve for equilibrium in which the decision maker makes the market, we must express
the decision maker’s objective function in terms of the model parameters. As shown above,
the decision maker’s trading proﬁt from choosing the degree of liquidity in the market (λ)i s
given by λV −C,w h e r eλ is the price sensitivity parameter she sets. We refer to the trading
proﬁts as a liquidity subsidy and focus on this measure throughout the paper.




This expression shows that the trading losses incurred by the decision maker are exactly
double the total acquisition costs for informed traders. The reason is that each informed
trader has private information and recognizes the impact his trades have on the equilibrium
securities price. To maximize his proﬁts, he trades less aggressively based on his signal,
which increases his proﬁts at the expense of the decision maker.
We can combine these trading losses with the decision maker’s maximized production
proﬁts (πMax
P0 ) when productivity (y) deviates from her forecast (x). Recall that the ex-
pression for production proﬁts in (2) relies on the assumption that the decision maker will
implement her best estimate of y after observing aggregate order ﬂow. In particular, the











which implies the following value for k:




Note that equation (24) computes the decision maker’s conditional expectation of produc-
tivity (E(y|Q)) by applying the conditional expectation formula for the jointly normally
distributed random variables productivity (y) and aggregate order ﬂow (Q).
We can simplify expression (2) for the decision maker’s maximized production proﬁts
using equation (24) for the eﬀort rule along with equations (20) and (21) for V and C:
29π
Max


















(N − 1)v +1
(27)









Because equation (18) establishes a one-to-one mapping between λ and v,w ec a nr e w r i t e





(N − 1)v +1
(29)





[(N − 1)v +1 ] 2 =0
The second-order condition for maximization is clearly satisﬁed because:
d2π0
dv2 = −2Ncv −
2N(N − 1)V0[(N − 1)v +1 ]
[(N − 1)v +1 ] 3 < 0
This implies that the ﬁrst-order condition characterizes a maximum. Rearranging the ﬁrst-
order condition slightly, we obtain a cubic equation in v t h a tc a nb es o l v e di nc l o s e df o r m
using standard methods:




⇒ v = v(N,V0/cv) (30)
Equation (30) can be solved in closed form using the cubic equation to obtain at least one
positive real root for v. Because the analytical expression for v is quite cumbersome, in the
interest of brevity and clarity, we denote the unique positive real root in equation (30) as
30v(N,V0/cv).23
Now we can combine equation (30) and equation (18) to ﬁnd a solution for λ in terms




(N − 1)v +1
(N − 1)v +2
¶2
⇒ λ = λ(N,V0/cv) (31)




λ(N,V0/cv)[(N − 1)v(N,V0/cv)+2 ]
(32)
From equation (25), the deﬁnitions of V and C in (20) and (21), and equation (32) for bI,








Note that 1 ≤ k ≤ 2 because v ∈ [0,1].Q E D .
Proof of Proposition 2: W ec a nr e w r i t ee q u a t i o n( 3 0 )a sF(v,N) − G(V0,c v)=0 .



























[3(N − 1)v +1 ] [ ( N − 1)v +1 ]
< 0
Moreover, for N>1, equation (31) establishes a monotonically increasing relationship be-
tween v and λ. This means that the derivatives of λ with respect to the model parameters
m u s tt h es a m es i g n st ot h ed e r i v a t i v e so fv, which means that λ
−1 has the opposite signs.
For N =1 , λ is equal to a constant, implying that all the derivatives of λ are zero.
















23An explicit closed form solution is available from the authors upon request.
31Thus, trading proﬁts increase with N if and only if:
v>1/(N +3 )
This condition may or may not be met depending on the values of V0 and cv.
















This implies that trading proﬁts increase with cv if and only if:
V0/cv >v [(N − 1)v +1 ]
2 +2 ( N − 1)v
2[(N − 1)v +1 ]
v<1/(N − 1)
When N =1 , this clearly holds, but the condition will sometimes fail depending on the
values of cv and V0. For example, when N =2and V0/cv > 9/4, the reader can verify that
v>1/2, which violates the condition above.
N e x t ,w ee v a l u a t eh o wt r a d i n gp r o ﬁts depend on V0. T h i si se a s i e rb e c a u s eV0 only







[(N − 1)v + 1][3(N − 1)v +1 ]
< 0
This implies that the decision maker subsidizes trading more when information is more
valuable for production.
To assess how price informativeness varies with information acquisition cost, we diﬀeren-
tiate equation (27) with respect to cv:




((N − 1)v +1 ) 2(3(N − 1)v +1 )
< 0
This means that prices are less informative when information acquisition costs are higher.
Furthermore, by inspecting equation (27), we see that d(V0 − Vδ)/dV0 must be positive
because price informativeness increases with V0 directly and indirectly through v.
32Finally, the change in price informativeness with respect to the number of informed
traders is less clear.
d(V0 − Vδ)/dN =
−NV0
((N − 1)v +1 ) 2
2v2
3(N − 1)v +1
+
v(1 − v)V0
((N − 1)v +1 )
2 < 0 if and only if
3(N − 1)v
2 − (N − 4)v − 1 < 0
which will sometimes fail depending on the values of N, cv and V0. For example, when N =2
and V0/cv > 32/27, the reader can verify that v>1/3, which violates the condition above.
QED.
Proof of Proposition 3: Recall that we have already computed the production proﬁts
conditional on acquiring the level of information in equation (27) and total information
acquisition costs are given by Ncvv2/2. Thus, social welfare maximization can be written:
max
v W = −Ncvv
2/2+
NvV0
(N − 1)v +1
(33)
First, we look for the socially optimal information acquisition level, which we refer to as vsoc.





[(N − 1)vsoc +1 ] 2 =0
The second-order condition for maximization is clearly satisﬁed because:
d2W
dv2 = −Ncv −
N(N − 1)V0
[(N − 1)v +1 ] 3 < 0
This implies that the ﬁrst-order condition characterizes a social welfare maximum. Rear-
ranging the ﬁrst-order condition slightly, we obtain a cubic equation in vsoc that can be
solved in closed form using standard methods:




Because V0 > 0 and cv is ﬁnite, we can infer that vsoc > 0. Clearly, this is greater than
the level of information acquisition (v =0 ) when the decision maker does not participate in
the securities market and there is no trade.
Now we establish that the decision maker’s subsidy is insuﬃcient to motivate the socially
33optimal level of information acquisition. We know that dW/dv =0when evaluated at vsoc.
If we can show that dW/dv − dπ/dv > 0 when both derivatives are evaluated at the social
optimum (v = vsoc), then we can infer that the decision maker’s choice is less than the social




(v = vsoc) −
dπ
dv
(v = vsoc)=Ncvvsoc > 0
This means that the socially optimal level of information acquisition will always exceed the
decision maker’s private optimum.
Finally, recall that equation (18) establishes a one-to-one mapping between liquidity and
the equilibrium level of information precision acquired by informed traders. This means that
all of the information acquisition comparisons above also apply to securities market liquidity.
QED.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 :T h eﬁrst step is to determine the trading strategies of the
informed trader and the stakeholder. The informed trader solves the same proﬁt maximiza-
tion problems as before in equations (11) and (15). The general solution to his problem is
g i v e ni ne q u a t i o n( 1 3 ) . F o rt h em o d e li nt h i ss e c t i o n ,w eh a v ecv =0 , v =1and N =1 .
With these values, equation (13) becomes:
bI =( 1 /2λ) ⇒ qI =( 1 /2λ)s (34)
The stakeholder’s proﬁt maximization problem can be written:
qM ∈ argmax
e qM
E(b qM(y − p)+θx)
where Q = qI + qM. Substituting the equilibrium pricing and decision rules, we obtain:
qM ∈ argmax
e qM
E(b qM(y − λ(qI + b qM)) + θkλ(qI + b qM))
which has the solution:
qM =( k/2)θ (35)
Now we can examine how much aggregate order ﬂow varies and covaries with productivity.








34C = V0/2λ (37)
Furthermore, we note that a competitive market maker must set market liquidity (λc)t o
satisfy a zero trading proﬁt constraint, which can be found by setting her proﬁts in equation
(22) equal to zero:
λc = C/V (38)
Because we maintain the assumption that the decision maker will choose the optimal
rule after observing the securities market price, we can use the same expression for k from
equation (25) in the earlier model. Combining equations (25) and (38), we ﬁnd that the
decision maker sets k =1 , implying that x = p.
Next, we can determine an explicit solution for the price sensitivity set by a competitive
market maker (λc) described in equation (38). Substituting the expressions for V and C in

















which is identical to the expression in Kyle (1985).
Now we can use the equilibrium values for liquidity (λc)a n dt h ed e c i s i o nr u l e( k)t o





















In the competitive market making equilibrium, we are examining the hypothetical situa-
tion in which the decision maker does not trade. This means that her total proﬁts are equal
35to her production proﬁts. Using the pricing rule along with the equation for λc,w eﬁnd that
the decision maker’s expected total proﬁts are given by:
π0 = π
Max
P0 = V0 − E(y − p)
2 = V0/2 (40)
In addition, this equation reveals that the mean squared prediction error for prices is given
by E(y − p)2 = V0/2, which is the same value as in Kyle (1985). In equation (3), we
also deﬁned this value as the price informativeness. In a competitive equilibrium without
decision maker intervention in the securities market, price informativeness is unaﬀected by
the amount of stakeholder trading.
Finally, we note that there is no trade when Vθ → 0 because this implies that qM → 0
and λc →∞ , which implies that qI → 0.Q E D .
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 : First, we focus on both the decision maker’s and the stake-
holder’s production proﬁts. To determine the decision maker’s production proﬁts, we follow
the exact same logic that led to equation (26). Then we can substitute equations (36) and









U s i n gt h ea s s u m e dp r i c i n ga n dd e c i s i o nr u l e sa l o n gw i t he q u a t i o n( 3 5 ) ,w eﬁnd that the
stakeholder’s payoﬀ from the production eﬀort chosen by the decision maker (x)i sg i v e nb y :
πPM = E(θx)=E(θkλQ)=λk
2Vθ/2
Because the decision maker will choose optimally given the market price she observes, this
implies that the constraint on k in equation (25) must hold. Combining this constraint with
the expressions for V and C in (36) and (37), we infer that:
(λ
2k(λ)
2Vθ + V0)k(λ) − 2V0 =0 (41)
We can also combine equation (25) with the non-positive trading proﬁts restriction to show
that k>1:
πT0 = λV − C ≤ 0 ⇒ k(λ)=C/λV ≥ 1
We also note that strictly negative trading proﬁts implies that λ<C / V = λc,w h i c h
means that k>1. The decision maker sets prices to underreact to information in order
36for informed traders to reap extra proﬁts from their trades. However, the decision maker’s
eﬀo r tr u l e( x = kp) is not biased. She appropriately adjusts for the underreaction in prices
by changing her eﬀort level more than one-for-one in response to changes in prices.




Because the left-hand side is always positive (assuming Vθ > 0), the right-hand side must
always be positive, implying that k<2.T h u s ,1 <k<2.








Now we can write the maximization problem for the decision maker as:
max
λ
λV − C + C
2/V
subject to k = k(λ) and λV − C ≤ 0. The second constraint ensures that the uninformed
decision maker will not make positive trading proﬁts as a market maker. We will solve the
maximization problem by ﬁrst ignoring this second constraint, but verifying later that it is























































































2(2 − k) − k
2 +3 k − 1=0 (45)
which can be solved for λ in terms of k:
λ =
3k − (1 + k2)
k2(2 − k)
(46)
Using this solution for λ(k) in the k(λ) in equation (41), we obtain a solution for k:
[3k − (1 + k
2)]
2Vθ/V0 − (2 − k)
3k =0 (47)
Equation (47) provides an explicit decision rule k as a function of natural liquidity (Vθ/V0),
which can be solved in closed form using the quartic formula identiﬁed by Ferrari and Car-
dano (1545). Because the analytical expression for k is quite cumbersome, in the interest of
brevity and clarity, we denote the unique positive real root for k in equation (47) as k(Vθ/V0)
to emphasize its dependence on natural liquidity (Vθ/V0).24








We can evaluate the ﬁrst-order condition in equation (45) at k =1and λ =
p
V0/Vθ,





V0/Vθ) ∝ 1 −
p
V0/Vθ
This equation shows that dπ/dλ < 0 if and only if Vθ <V 0. In other words, the competitive
level of price sensitivity is too high when there is little manipulative (endogenous noise)
trading activity. Thus, we conclude that the decision maker is willing to subsidize liquidity
provision (i.e.,s e tλ<λ c) in the securities market in situations where the stakeholder
24An explicit closed form solution is available from the authors upon request.
38(endogenous noise trader) provides the least liquidity. However, the decision maker will not
intervene in the securities market when the amount of stakeholder trade is suﬃciently large
(i.e., Vθ ≥ V0).
Furthermore, we can easily show that the decision maker’s liquidity subsidy induces the
informed agent to trade more aggressively (i.e., set bI higher) based on his information. By
deﬁnition, the decision maker’s liquidity subsidy decreases λ relative to λc.U s i n ge q u a t i o n
(34) for the informed trader’s aggressiveness (bI), we see that the informed trader uses his
signal more when liquidity is greater.
In addition, we note that the stakeholder trades more aggressively (i.e.,s e t sbM higher)
based on his decision objective (θ) when the decision maker subsidizes liquidity. The stake-
holder’s trading aggressiveness (bM)i sg i v e nb yk/2 according to equation (35), which clearly
increases in k. We have already shown above that the decision maker selects a greater k value
when she sets prices than she would when the competitive market maker sets prices–i.e.,
k>1. As a result, the stakeholder trades more aggressively based on his decision objective
(θ) when the decision maker sets prices.
Lastly, we note that total price informativeness is equal to the decision maker’s maximized
production proﬁts, which we showed explicitly in equation (3). When the decision maker
chooses to subsidize liquidity, she does so only because it increases her total proﬁts. Because
her trading proﬁts decrease when she subsidizes liquidity, we can infer that her production
proﬁts must increase. This implies that price informativeness is greater when the decision
maker subsidizes liquidity. QED.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 : First, we examine how natural liquidity (Vθ/V0)a ﬀects the






[3k − (1 + k2)]2/2
[3k − (1 + k2)](3 − 2k)Vθ/V0 +( 2 k − 1)(2 − k)2




−(2 − k)−2[3k − (1 + k2)]3/2
(3 − 2k)(2 − k)k +[ 3 k − (1 + k2)](2k − 1)
(48)
39Because the numerator above is always negative, we infer that dk
d(Vθ/V0) is negative if and only
if the denominator is positive. After some simpliﬁcation, this condition is equivalent to:
dk/d(Vθ/V0) < 0 if and only if k +1> 0
w h i c hi sa l w a y st r u eb e c a u s e1 <k<2.W ec o n c l u d et h a tdk/d(Vθ/V0) < 0.
By diﬀerentiating the λ(k) solution in equation (46) with respect to k,w ec a ns h o wt h a t
price is more responsive to order ﬂow when the eﬀort decision is more responsive to the price:
dλ/dk =
4 − 9k +6 k2 − k3
k3(2 − k)2 =
(k − 1)2(4 − k)
k3(2 − k)3 > 0
where the last inequality holds because we have already shown that 1 <k<2. This means
that the comparative statics results for k also hold for λ, implying that dλ/d(Vθ/V0) < 0.
N o ww ec a na d d r e s sw h a th a p p e n st ot h es i z eo ft h el i q u i d i t ys u b s i d ya sn a t u r a lm a r k e t
liquidity (Vθ/V0) increases. Using equations (22) and (25), the size of the subsidy is given
by:
πT0 = λV − C = λV (1 − k) ≤ 0
where the inequality relies on the fact that k ≥ 1. This equation can be simpliﬁed by
substituting using equations (36) and (46):
πT0 =( V0/4)
∙
k2(2 − k)2 +( 3 k − (1 + k2))2Vθ/V0
(3k − (1 + k2))(2 − k)
¸
(1 − k)
Using the solution for k(Vθ/V0) implicitly deﬁn e db ye q u a t i o n( 4 7 ) ,w ec a ns i m p l i f yt h e
liquidity subsidy further:
πT0 =( V0/2)[3k − (1 + k
2)]
−1k(2 − k)(1 − k) ≤ 0
By inspection, it is clear that πT0 =0either when Vθ/V0 =1and k =1or when Vθ/V0 =
0 and k =2 . In addition, we see that πT0 < 0 for 0 <V θ/V0 < 1 and 1 <k<2.
This immediately implies that there is a non-monotonic relationship between the size of the
subsidy and the market’s natural liquidity. In particular, as natural liquidity increases from
Vθ =0to Vθ > 0, the size of the liquidity subsidy increases. However, beyond some cut-oﬀ
point V between 0 and V0, the size of the liquidity subsidy diminishes when natural liquidity
increases.
40Now we examine how the decision maker’s expected total proﬁts depend on natural
liquidity (Vθ/V0). In particular, we will evaluate how the diﬀerence between her proﬁts when
she subsidizes liquidity and her proﬁts when she does not subsidize liquidity depends on
natural liquidity. This measures reveals how the impact of the liquidity subsidy depends on
natural liquidity. The diﬀerence between her proﬁts when she subsidizes liquidity and her





























w h e r ew eh a v ei g n o r e dt h ei n d i r e c te ﬀect of natural liquidity through λ and k(λ) by the

















where the ﬁnal inequality holds because 1 <k<2.Q E D .
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7 : We can evaluate social welfare (Wsoc) as the sum of the
expected production proﬁts of the decision maker in equation (26) and the expected non-





2/V + E(θx) (49)
In the hypothetical competitive equilibrium, the decision maker’s expected production proﬁts
are given by V0/2 and the stakeholder’s non-trading proﬁts are given by
√
V0Vθ/2.T h i s








We can compare the social welfare at the competitive equilibrium, when the decision
41maker sets liquidity in the securities market, and when a social planner sets liquidity in the









where we have used our assumption that the decision maker implements her optimal eﬀort
rule after observing the equilibrium price. This expression for social welfare with decision
maker intervention can be simpliﬁed somewhat using the constraint on k in equation (41):
W(λ)=( k/2)V0[(1 + λkVθ/V0)] (51)
To ﬁnd the social optimum, we must diﬀerentiate the social welfare function identiﬁed above









w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dt h ed i ﬀerentiated constraint on k in equation (42). By evaluating the
derivative at the competitive optimum of k =1and λ =
p
V0/Vθ, we can compare the social















This means that λc is too high from a social standpoint, implying that the competitive
level of liquidity (λ
−1
c ) is lower than the social optimum. To compare the social and private













Whenever λ = λsoc and dW/dλ =0 ,w em u s th a v edπ/dλ > 0, which implies that
the private optimum always entails a greater level of price sensitivity (λ) than the social
optimum. In other words, the private optimum always involves less liquidity (λ
−1)t h a nt h e
socially optimal level of liquidity (λ
−1
soc). Combining this result with the earlier result that
the private optimum always entails at least as much liquidity provision as the competitive
optimum, we infer that the decision maker’s liquidity subsidy in the private optimum always
improves upon the competitive optimum.
42Next, we can evaluate the change in social welfare resulting from the decision maker’s
intervention. Social welfare under the decision maker’s intervention is given by equation
(51). Social welfare under the competitive market maker is given by equation (50). Thus,
the change in social welfare resulting from decision maker intervention is the diﬀerence
between these two expressions:
∆W =( k/2)V0[(1 + λkVθ/V0)] − (V0/2+
p




using the constraint on k in equation (41). We can simplify this equation using the decision
maker’s simpliﬁed ﬁrst-order condition in equation (45):










Diﬀerentiating this expression with respect to Vθ/V0,w eo b t a i n :
d∆W
d(Vθ/V0)








(1 + (Vθ/V0)+( Vθ/V0)(2 − k)
−2)
where dk/d(Vθ/V0) is given by equation (48), which can be simpliﬁed using the solution for




[3k − (1 + k2)](2 − k)k
2(Vθ/V0)(1 + k)







−1/2 + k − 1+( 2− k)
−1
−
[3k − (1 + k2)]3
2(2 − k)2(1 + k)
−
[3k − (1 + k2)](2 − k)k
2(1 + k)









[3k − (1 + k2)]
(2 − k)
−
[3k − (1 + k2)]3
2(2 − k)2(1 + k)
−
[3k − (1 + k2)]k
2(1 + k)(2 − k)
((2 − k)
2 +1 )
w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dt h es o l u t i o nf o rk in equation (47) in the simplifying step above. After
some additional algebra that relies on the fact that 1 <k<2, one can show that d∆W
d(Vθ/V0) < 0
43if and only if:
−(1 + k)
p
(2 − k)k + k(3 − 2k) < 0
By inspection, we see that d∆W
d(Vθ/V0) < 0 when 3
2 ≤ k<2 because both of the terms above
are negative. When k<3
2,t h ea b o v ee x p r e s s i o ni sn e g a t i v ei fa n do n l yi f :
k(3 − 2k) < (1 + k)
p
(2 − k)k








k − 1)(3k − 2) < 0
where both terms must be negative because 1 <k<3
2. Regardless of whether k ≥ 3
2 or
k<3
2,w es e et h a t d∆W
d(Vθ/V0) < 0. We conclude that the decision maker’s intervention enhances
social welfare more when natural liquidity (Vθ/V0) is low. QED.
Proof of Proposition 8: To prove this, we must verify that the decision maker and all
traders are willing to play the same equilibrium strategies (λ, k, bI, etc.) in both situations–
i.e., when the decision maker is trading in the market and when the decision maker makes
the market. Because we have already identiﬁed all agents’ equilibrium strategies when the
decision maker makes the market, we only need to verify that these strategies are also optimal
for all agents when the decision maker trades in the market.
We can think of the decision maker as indirectly selecting liquidity in the random trading
model, subject to the constraint that her selection must satisfy the competitive market
maker’s zero proﬁt constraint. To show there is an equilibrium in which the decision maker
s e l e c t st h es a m ed e g r e eo fl i q u i d i t ya si nt h em a r k e tm a k i n gm o d e l ,w ec a na s s u m ef o rn o w
that all other agents behave as they do in the market making equilibrium. If the decision
maker’s liquidity choice is the same given all other traders’ strategies and all other traders’
strategies are the same given the decision maker’s strategy, then the equilibria in the two
models must be the same. The general approach for showing that agents select the same
choices in both models is to show that they solve the same maximization problems subject
to the same constraints. Throughout the proof, we will denote the variables and parameters
in the random trading model by the same notation as in the market making model except
for the subscript R–e.g., the equilibrium price is given by pR rather than p.
To determine the decision maker’s optimization problem in the random trading model,
we must ﬁrst examine the liquidity set by the competitive market maker, which places a
44constraint on the decision maker’s liquidity choice. Because he treats the decision maker as
a noise trader, the competitive market maker maintains a simple linear pricing rule given
by:
pR = λR(QR + ρ) (53)
where QR i st h ea g g r e g a t eo r d e rﬂow of all other traders, which could include informed
traders and a decision stakeholder. After she observes the realization of ρ, the decision
maker can infer the aggregate order ﬂow of all other traders by inverting the equilibrium
price:
pR/λR − ρ = QR (54)
The decision maker’s inference about the conditional expectation of y i sb a s e do nt h e
aggregate order ﬂow of all other traders. This order ﬂow is distributed normally because
we are examining an equilibrium where strategies are linear and based on normally distrib-
uted random variables. Applying the conditional expectation formula for jointly normally





w h e r ew eh a v ed e ﬁned CR = Cov(y,QR) and VR = Va r(QR). Because we are assuming
for now that all other traders follow the same strategies as in the market making model
(QR = Q), the deﬁnitions of CR and VR imply that CR = C and VR = V as long as λR = λ,
which will be useful later. We suppress the dependence of the covariances and variances
of order ﬂow on the market maker’s pricing rule because these functional dependences are
identical in the random trading and market making models.
As before, we assume the decision maker cannot commit to any decision other than her
ex post optimal choice, which is xR = E(y|QR). Using equations (55) and (54), this choice




(pR/λR − ρ)=kRQR + kρρ (56)
w h e r ew eh a v ed e ﬁned two decision rule parameters, kR =
CR
λRVR and kρ = −
CR
VR, to facilitate
our analogy with the market making model. Moreover, we note that kR =
CR
λRVR is identical
to the expression (25) for k in the market making model (after substituting the random
trading model parameters). Because CR = C and VR = V whenever λR = λ, our expression
for kR = k as long as λR = λ. However, we still need to show that λR = λ.
45Recall that the decision maker’s total proﬁts come from both her production and her
trading activities. We can simplify her production proﬁts using the fact that kR = k,
CR = C,a n dVR = V whenever λR = λ. Following similar reasoning used in the market









The decision maker also realizes proﬁts or losses from her random trading activity. Using
the deﬁnition of trading proﬁts and the pricing rule equation (53), her random trading proﬁts
are given by:
πT0R = E(ρ(y − pR)) = −λRVρ (58)
Furthermore, the competitive market maker will set λR so that he will attain zero proﬁts
conditional on aggregate order ﬂow (QR+ρ). This means that λRVa r(QR+ρ)−Cov(y,QR+
ρ)=0 , so we can solve for the liquidity parameter λR:
λR =
Cov(y,QR + ρ)





Note that equation (59) implies there is a mapping between Vρ and λR, implying that we
can treat the decision maker’s random trading problem as one where she chooses λR.W e
rearrange equation (59) slightly, solving for the expected trading proﬁts of the decision maker:
−λRVρ = λRVR − CR (60)
Using (57), (58) and (60), we can write the decision maker’s total expected proﬁtm a x i -
mization with random trading as:
max
λR





which depends only on λR.B e c a u s e CR = C and VR = V whenever λR = λ, the random
trading objective function (61) above is isomorphic to the objective function for the decision
maker when she makes the market. In fact, in both the random trading model with informed
traders and the model with a decision stakeholder, the decision maker’s objective function
is given by the sum of equations (22) and (26), which has the same form of equation (61).
Thus, regardless of which traders are included in the random trading model, we infer that
λR = λ when all other traders are choosing their equilibrium trading strategies in the market
46making model. In addition, as noted above, λR = λ implies that kR = k.
Now we must still show that all other traders are willing to choose the same equilibrium
strategies given the liquidity and eﬀort decision rule choices, λR = λ and kR = k.T h a t
is, we must show that the decision maker’s random trading order (ρ) does not alter any
trader’s trading strategy, holding the liquidity and eﬀort rules constant. Consider a general
trader who may or may not have information about the security’s payoﬀ (y)a n dw h om a yo r




E[b qiR(y − p)+θx]
subject to pR = λR(QR + ρ) and xR = kRpR = kRλR(QR + ρ).
To determine whether there is an equilibrium in which all traders adopt the same strate-
gies as in the market making model, we can assume that all traders but one adopt their
same strategies (Q−iR = Q−i) and ask whether the single trader would have an incentive to
deviate from the equilibrium. As mentioned above, we can also assume that the decision
maker adopts the same equilibrium strategies for λ and k,s u c ht h a tλR = λ and kR = k.
Under these assumptions we can rewrite the trader’s maximization problem as:
max
e qiR
E[b qiR(y − kλ(Q−i + b qiR + ρ)) + θkλ(Q−i + b qiR + ρ)]
Now we note that, by construction, the decision maker’s random order has a zero mean




E[b qiR(y − kλ(Q−i + b qiR)) + θkλ(Q−i + b qiR)]
which is identical to the problem a trader solves in the market making model. We con-
clude that all traders would have no incentive to deviate from the identical random trading
equilibrium. QED.
47References
[1] Abramowicz, Michael, 2004, “Information Markets, Administrative Decisionmaking,
and Predictive Cost-Beneﬁt Analysis,” University of Chicago Law Review, 71, 933-1020.
[2] Aumann, Robert, 1976, “Agreeing to Disagree,” The Annals of Statistics, 4(6), 1236-
1239.
[3] Berg, Joyce, Robert Forsythe, Forrest Nelson and Thomas Rietz, 2006, “Results from
a Dozen Years of Election Futures Markets Research,” In Handbook of Experimental
Economics Results, Charles Plott and Vernon Smith eds., Elsevier.
[4] Blackwell, David, 1951, “Comparisons of Experiments,” Proceedings of the Second
Berkeley Symposium on Mathematical Statistics, 93-102.
[5] Blackwell, David, 1953, “Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments,” Annals of Mathe-
matical Statistics, 24, 265-72.
[6] Bond, Philip and Hulya Eraslan, 2005, “Information, Trade and Common Knowledge
with Endogenous Asset Values,” Wharton School Working Paper.
[7] Chen, Kay-Yut and Charles Plott, 2002, “Information Aggregation Mechanisms: Con-
cepts, Design, and Implementation for a Sales Forecasting Problem,” CalTech Working
Paper.
[8] Diamond, Douglas, 1980, “Rational Expectations with Asymmetric Information about
Production Technique,” Ph.D. Dissertation Yale University.
[9] Dow, James, Goldstein, Itay and Alexander Guembel, 2006, “Commitment to Overin-
vest and Price Informativeness,” Wharton University Working Paper.
[10] Dow, James and Gary Gorton, 1997, “Stock Market Eﬃciency and Economic Eﬃciency:
Is There a Connection?” Journal of Finance, 52(3), 1087-1129.
[11] Glosten, Lawrence, 1989, “Insider Trading, Liquidity and the Role of the Monopolist
Specialist,” Journal of Business, 62(2), 211-235.
[12] Glosten, Lawrence and Paul Milgrom, 1985, “Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices in a
Specialist Market with Heterogeneously Informed Traders,” Journal of Financial Eco-
nomics, 14, 71-100.
48[13] Grossman, Sanford J. and Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1980, “On the Impossibility of Informa-
tionally Eﬃcient Markets,” American Economic Review, 70(3), 393-408.
[14] Hanson, Robin, 2002, “Decision Markets,” in Entrepreneurial Economics: Bright Ideas
from the Dismal Science, Oxford University Press.
[15] Hanson, Robin, 2003, “Combinatorial Information Market Design,” Information Fron-
tier Systems, 5(1), 107-119.
[16] Hanson, Robin and Ryan Oprea, 2004, “Manipulators Increase Information Market
Accuracy,” George Mason Working Paper.
[17] Holmstrom, Bengt and Jean Tirole, 1993, “Market Liquidity and Performance Moni-
toring,” Journal of Political Economy, 101(4), 678-709.
[18] Kumar, Praveen and Duane Seppi, 1992, “Futures Manipulation with ‘Cash Settle-
ment,’” Journal of Finance, 47(4), 1485-1502.
[19] Kyle, Albert S., 1985, “Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading,” Econometrica 53(6),
1315-36.
[20] Ledyard, John, 2006, “Designing Information Markets for Policy Analysis,” in Informa-
tion Markets: A New Way of Making Decisions in the Public and Private Sectors,e d s .
Robert Hahn and Paul Tetlock, AEI-Brookings Press, forthcoming.
[21] Milgrom, Paul and Nancy Stokey, 1982, “Information, Trade and Common Knowledge,”
Journal of Economic Theory, 26(1),17-27.
[22] Osband, Kent, 1989, “Optimal Forecasting Incentives,” Journal of Political Economy,
97(5), 1091-1112.
[23] Raiﬀa, Howard, 1968, Decision Analysis, Addison-Wesley.
[24] Raiﬀa, Howard and Robert Schlaifer, 1961, Applied Statistical Decision Theory, MIT
Press.
[25] Roll, Richard, 1988, “R-squared,” Journal of Finance,4 3 ( 2 ) ,5 4 1 - 5 6 6 .
[26] Sherman, Ann and Sheridan Titman, 2002, “Building the IPO Order Book: Underpric-
ing and Participation Limits with Costly Information,” Journal of Financial Economics,
65, 3-29.
49[27] Subrahmanyam, Avanidhar and Sheridan Titman, 1999, “The Going-Public Decision
and the Development of Financial Markets,” Journal of Finance, 54(3), 1045-1082.
[28] Sunstein, Cass, 2006, Infotopia: How Many Minds Produce Knowledge, Oxford Univer-
sity Press, forthcoming.
[29] Wolfers, Justin and Eric Zitzewitz, 2004, “Prediction Markets,” Journal of Economic
Perspectives 18(2), 107-126.
[30] Wolfers, Justin and Eric Zitzewitz, 2006, “Five Open Questions About Prediction Mar-
kets,” in Information Markets: A New Way of Making Decisions in the Public and
Private Sectors, eds. Robert Hahn and Paul Tetlock, AEI-Brookings Press, forthcom-
ing.
50